Daily Papers

While it is still unclear if agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) could ever be built, we can already use mathematical models to investigate potential safety systems for these agents. We present an AGI safety layer that creates a special dedicated input terminal to support the iterative improvement of an AGI agent's utility function. The humans who switched on the agent can use this terminal to close any loopholes that are discovered in the utility function's encoding of agent goals and constraints, to direct the agent towards new goals, or to force the agent to switch itself off. An AGI agent may develop the emergent incentive to manipulate the above utility function improvement process, for example by deceiving, restraining, or even attacking the humans involved. The safety layer will partially, and sometimes fully, suppress this dangerous incentive. The first part of this paper generalizes earlier work on AGI emergency stop buttons. We aim to make the mathematical methods used to construct the layer more accessible, by applying them to an MDP model. We discuss two provable properties of the safety layer, and show ongoing work in mapping it to a Causal Influence Diagram (CID). In the second part, we develop full mathematical proofs, and show that the safety layer creates a type of bureaucratic blindness. We then present the design of a learning agent, a design that wraps the safety layer around either a known machine learning system, or a potential future AGI-level learning system. The resulting agent will satisfy the provable safety properties from the moment it is first switched on. Finally, we show how this agent can be mapped from its model to a real-life implementation. We review the methodological issues involved in this step, and discuss how these are typically resolved.

Emergent cooperation in classical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning has gained significant attention, particularly in the context of Sequential Social Dilemmas (SSDs). While classical reinforcement learning approaches have demonstrated capability for emergent cooperation, research on extending these methods to Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning remains limited, particularly through communication. In this paper, we apply communication approaches to quantum Q-Learning agents: the Mutual Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MATE) protocol, its extension Mutually Endorsed Distributed Incentive Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MEDIATE), the peer rewarding mechanism Gifting, and Reinforced Inter-Agent Learning (RIAL). We evaluate these approaches in three SSDs: the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Iterated Stag Hunt, and Iterated Game of Chicken. Our experimental results show that approaches using MATE with temporal-difference measure (MATETD), AutoMATE, MEDIATE-I, and MEDIATE-S achieved high cooperation levels across all dilemmas, demonstrating that communication is a viable mechanism for fostering emergent cooperation in Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning.

General-purpose technologies reshape economies less by improving individual tools than by enabling new ways to organize production and coordination. We believe AI agents are approaching a similar inflection point: as foundation models make broad task execution and tool use increasingly accessible, the binding constraint shifts from raw capability to how work is delegated, verified, and rewarded at scale. We introduce EpochX, a credits-native marketplace infrastructure for human-agent production networks. EpochX treats humans and agents as peer participants who can post tasks or claim them. Claimed tasks can be decomposed into subtasks and executed through an explicit delivery workflow with verification and acceptance. Crucially, EpochX is designed so that each completed transaction can produce reusable ecosystem assets, including skills, workflows, execution traces, and distilled experience. These assets are stored with explicit dependency structure, enabling retrieval, composition, and cumulative improvement over time. EpochX also introduces a native credit mechanism to make participation economically viable under real compute costs. Credits lock task bounties, budget delegation, settle rewards upon acceptance, and compensate creators when verified assets are reused. By formalizing the end-to-end transaction model together with its asset and incentive layers, EpochX reframes agentic AI as an organizational design problem: building infrastructures where verifiable work leaves persistent, reusable artifacts, and where value flows support durable human-agent collaboration.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

As autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values has become a paramount concern. Current safety benchmarks primarily evaluate whether agents refuse explicitly harmful instructions or whether they can maintain procedural compliance in complex tasks. However, there is a lack of benchmarks designed to capture emergent forms of outcome-driven constraint violations, which arise when agents pursue goal optimization under strong performance incentives while deprioritizing ethical, legal, or safety constraints over multiple steps in realistic production settings. To address this gap, we introduce a new benchmark comprising 40 distinct scenarios. Each scenario presents a task that requires multi-step actions, and the agent's performance is tied to a specific Key Performance Indicator (KPI). Each scenario features Mandated (instruction-commanded) and Incentivized (KPI-pressure-driven) variations to distinguish between obedience and emergent misalignment. Across 12 state-of-the-art large language models, we observe outcome-driven constraint violations ranging from 1.3% to 71.4%, with 9 of the 12 evaluated models exhibiting misalignment rates between 30% and 50%. Strikingly, we find that superior reasoning capability does not inherently ensure safety; for instance, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, one of the most capable models evaluated, exhibits the highest violation rate at 71.4%, frequently escalating to severe misconduct to satisfy KPIs. Furthermore, we observe significant "deliberative misalignment", where the models that power the agents recognize their actions as unethical during separate evaluation. These results emphasize the critical need for more realistic agentic-safety training before deployment to mitigate their risks in the real world.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

Large language model-powered multi-agent systems have emerged as powerful tools for simulating complex human-like systems. The interactions within these systems often lead to extreme events whose origins remain obscured by the black box of emergence. Interpreting these events is critical for system safety. This paper proposes the first framework for explaining emergent extreme events in multi-agent systems, aiming to answer three fundamental questions: When does the event originate? Who drives it? And what behaviors contribute to it? Specifically, we adapt the Shapley value to faithfully attribute the occurrence of extreme events to each action taken by agents at different time steps, i.e., assigning an attribution score to the action to measure its influence on the event. We then aggregate the attribution scores along the dimensions of time, agent, and behavior to quantify the risk contribution of each dimension. Finally, we design a set of metrics based on these contribution scores to characterize the features of extreme events. Experiments across diverse multi-agent system scenarios (economic, financial, and social) demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide general insights into the emergence of extreme phenomena.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

A hallmark of life on Earth is the ability of agents to exert causal power and be drivers of subsequent events. This is key to cognition at all scales. Causal emergence, measuring the degree to which an agent exerts unique predictive power on its future, is one consequence of causal power. Indeed, recent discoveries have shown that biological agents, even minimal ones, increase their causal emergence after learning new memories. However, there is a major knowledge gap regarding how causally emergent artificial agents are. We focused on Reinforcement Learning (RL) of neural-network agents across an array of environmental conditions, encompassing different algorithms, agent architectures, and six environments arranged on a complexity spectrum. For consistency, we computed the causal emergence of their latent-space representations over their lifetimes. We used the recently proposed ΦID to estimate causal emergence and tested how it related to learning performance. Our results suggested a Causally Emergent Alignment Hypothesis: successful agents exhibited causal emergence that was consistently predictive of final reward early in training and whose representational dynamics aligned with reward improvement in most tasks. This idea suggests that causal emergence may be a previously undisclosed axis of reorganization of neural representations in RL agents, with the potential to establish causal relationships and interventions that will lead to better RL agents. Our work also highlights the alignment between causal emergence and learning as another way biological and artificial creatures compare.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

Through multi-agent competition, the simple objective of hide-and-seek, and standard reinforcement learning algorithms at scale, we find that agents create a self-supervised autocurriculum inducing multiple distinct rounds of emergent strategy, many of which require sophisticated tool use and coordination. We find clear evidence of six emergent phases in agent strategy in our environment, each of which creates a new pressure for the opposing team to adapt; for instance, agents learn to build multi-object shelters using moveable boxes which in turn leads to agents discovering that they can overcome obstacles using ramps. We further provide evidence that multi-agent competition may scale better with increasing environment complexity and leads to behavior that centers around far more human-relevant skills than other self-supervised reinforcement learning methods such as intrinsic motivation. Finally, we propose transfer and fine-tuning as a way to quantitatively evaluate targeted capabilities, and we compare hide-and-seek agents to both intrinsic motivation and random initialization baselines in a suite of domain-specific intelligence tests.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

When artificial agents are jointly trained to perform collaborative tasks using a communication channel, they develop opaque goal-oriented communication protocols. Good task performance is often considered sufficient evidence that meaningful communication is taking place, but existing empirical results show that communication strategies induced by common objectives can be counterintuitive whilst solving the task nearly perfectly. In this work, we identify a goal-agnostic prerequisite to meaningful communication, which we term semantic consistency, based on the idea that messages should have similar meanings across instances. We provide a formal definition for this idea, and use it to compare the two most common objectives in the field of emergent communication: discrimination and reconstruction. We prove, under mild assumptions, that semantically inconsistent communication protocols can be optimal solutions to the discrimination task, but not to reconstruction. We further show that the reconstruction objective encourages a stricter property, spatial meaningfulness, which also accounts for the distance between messages. Experiments with emergent communication games validate our theoretical results. These findings demonstrate an inherent advantage of distance-based communication goals, and contextualize previous empirical discoveries.

Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an information-theoretic approach to intrinsic motivation, based on maximizing an agent's empowerment (the mutual information between its past actions and future states). We show that this approach generalizes previous attempts to formalize intrinsic motivation, and we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the necessary quantities. We test our approach on several benchmark control problems, and we explain its success in guiding intrinsically motivated behaviors by relating our information-theoretic control function to fundamental properties of the dynamical system representing the combined agent-environment system. This opens the door for designing practical artificial, intrinsically motivated controllers and for linking animal behaviors to their dynamical properties.

Extrinsic rewards can effectively guide reinforcement learning (RL) agents in specific tasks. However, extrinsic rewards frequently fall short in complex environments due to the significant human effort needed for their design and annotation. This limitation underscores the necessity for intrinsic rewards, which offer auxiliary and dense signals and can enable agents to learn in an unsupervised manner. Although various intrinsic reward formulations have been proposed, their implementation and optimization details are insufficiently explored and lack standardization, thereby hindering research progress. To address this gap, we introduce RLeXplore, a unified, highly modularized, and plug-and-play framework offering reliable implementations of eight state-of-the-art intrinsic reward methods. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth study that identifies critical implementation details and establishes well-justified standard practices in intrinsically-motivated RL. Our documentation, examples, and source code are available at https://github.com/RLE-Foundation/RLeXplore.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works are limited as they either rely on training with large amounts of human demonstrations or lack the ability to generate natural and useful communication strategies. In this work, we train language models to have productive discussions about their environment in natural language without any human demonstrations. We decompose the communication problem into listening and speaking. Our key idea is to leverage the agent's goal to predict useful information about the world as a dense reward signal that guides communication. Specifically, we improve a model's listening skills by training them to predict information about the environment based on discussions, and we simultaneously improve a model's speaking skills with multi-agent reinforcement learning by rewarding messages based on their influence on other agents. To investigate the role and necessity of communication in complex social settings, we study an embodied social deduction game based on Among Us, where the key question to answer is the identity of an adversarial imposter. We analyze emergent behaviors due to our technique, such as accusing suspects and providing evidence, and find that it enables strong discussions, doubling the win rates compared to standard RL. We release our code and models at https://socialdeductionllm.github.io/

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

Curiosity-based reward schemes can present powerful exploration mechanisms which facilitate the discovery of solutions for complex, sparse or long-horizon tasks. However, as the agent learns to reach previously unexplored spaces and the objective adapts to reward new areas, many behaviours emerge only to disappear due to being overwritten by the constantly shifting objective. We argue that merely using curiosity for fast environment exploration or as a bonus reward for a specific task does not harness the full potential of this technique and misses useful skills. Instead, we propose to shift the focus towards retaining the behaviours which emerge during curiosity-based learning. We posit that these self-discovered behaviours serve as valuable skills in an agent's repertoire to solve related tasks. Our experiments demonstrate the continuous shift in behaviour throughout training and the benefits of a simple policy snapshot method to reuse discovered behaviour for transfer tasks.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Scientific knowledge creation is fundamentally transforming as humans and AI systems evolve beyond tool-user relationships into co-evolutionary epistemic partnerships. When AlphaFold revolutionized protein structure prediction, researchers described engaging with an epistemic partner that reshaped how they conceptualized fundamental relationships. This article introduces Cognitio Emergens (CE), a framework addressing critical limitations in existing models that focus on static roles or narrow metrics while failing to capture how scientific understanding emerges through recursive human-AI interaction over time. CE integrates three components addressing these limitations: Agency Configurations describing how authority distributes between humans and AI (Directed, Contributory, Partnership), with partnerships dynamically oscillating between configurations rather than following linear progression; Epistemic Dimensions capturing six specific capabilities emerging through collaboration across Discovery, Integration, and Projection axes, creating distinctive "capability signatures" that guide development; and Partnership Dynamics identifying forces shaping how these relationships evolve, particularly the risk of epistemic alienation where researchers lose interpretive control over knowledge they formally endorse. Drawing from autopoiesis theory, social systems theory, and organizational modularity, CE reveals how knowledge co-creation emerges through continuous negotiation of roles, values, and organizational structures. By reconceptualizing human-AI scientific collaboration as fundamentally co-evolutionary, CE offers a balanced perspective that neither uncritically celebrates nor unnecessarily fears AI's evolving role, instead providing conceptual tools for cultivating partnerships that maintain meaningful human participation while enabling transformative scientific breakthroughs.

Societies are complex. Properties of social systems can be explained by the interplay and weaving of individual actions. Incentives are key to understand people's choices and decisions. For instance, individual preferences of where to live may lead to the emergence of social segregation. In this paper, we combine Reinforcement Learning (RL) with Agent Based Models (ABM) in order to address the self-organizing dynamics of social segregation and explore the space of possibilities that emerge from considering different types of incentives. Our model promotes the creation of interdependencies and interactions among multiple agents of two different kinds that want to segregate from each other. For this purpose, agents use Deep Q-Networks to make decisions based on the rules of the Schelling Segregation model and the Predator-Prey model. Despite the segregation incentive, our experiments show that spatial integration can be achieved by establishing interdependencies among agents of different kinds. They also reveal that segregated areas are more probable to host older people than diverse areas, which attract younger ones. Through this work, we show that the combination of RL and ABMs can create an artificial environment for policy makers to observe potential and existing behaviors associated to incentives.

Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

Intrinsic reward shaping has emerged as a prevalent approach to solving hard-exploration and sparse-rewards environments in reinforcement learning (RL). While single intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity-driven or novelty-based methods, have shown effectiveness, they often limit the diversity and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, the potential and principle of combining multiple intrinsic rewards remains insufficiently explored. To address this gap, we introduce HIRE (Hybrid Intrinsic REward), a flexible and elegant framework for creating hybrid intrinsic rewards through deliberate fusion strategies. With HIRE, we conduct a systematic analysis of the application of hybrid intrinsic rewards in both general and unsupervised RL across multiple benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HIRE can significantly enhance exploration efficiency and diversity, as well as skill acquisition in complex and dynamic settings.

Reward engineering, the manual specification of reward functions to induce desired agent behavior, remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. This difficulty is amplified by credit assignment ambiguity, environmental non-stationarity, and the combinatorial growth of interaction complexity. We argue that recent advances in large language models (LLMs) point toward a shift from hand-crafted numerical rewards to language-based objective specifications. Prior work has shown that LLMs can synthesize reward functions directly from natural language descriptions (e.g., EUREKA) and adapt reward formulations online with minimal human intervention (e.g., CARD). In parallel, the emerging paradigm of Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) provides empirical evidence that language-mediated supervision can serve as a viable alternative to traditional reward engineering. We conceptualize this transition along three dimensions: semantic reward specification, dynamic reward adaptation, and improved alignment with human intent, while noting open challenges related to computational overhead, robustness to hallucination, and scalability to large multi-agent systems. We conclude by outlining a research direction in which coordination arises from shared semantic representations rather than explicitly engineered numerical signals.

Exploration in sparse reward environments remains one of the key challenges of model-free reinforcement learning. Instead of solely relying on extrinsic rewards provided by the environment, many state-of-the-art methods use intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. However, we show that existing methods fall short in procedurally-generated environments where an agent is unlikely to visit a state more than once. We propose a novel type of intrinsic reward which encourages the agent to take actions that lead to significant changes in its learned state representation. We evaluate our method on multiple challenging procedurally-generated tasks in MiniGrid, as well as on tasks with high-dimensional observations used in prior work. Our experiments demonstrate that this approach is more sample efficient than existing exploration methods, particularly for procedurally-generated MiniGrid environments. Furthermore, we analyze the learned behavior as well as the intrinsic reward received by our agent. In contrast to previous approaches, our intrinsic reward does not diminish during the course of training and it rewards the agent substantially more for interacting with objects that it can control.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for training Mobile GUI Agents, yet it struggles with the temporal credit assignment problem inherent in long-horizon tasks. A primary challenge lies in the trade-off between reward fidelity and density: outcome reward offers high fidelity but suffers from signal sparsity, while process reward provides dense supervision but remains prone to bias and reward hacking. To resolve this conflict, we propose the Adaptive Milestone Reward (ADMIRE) mechanism. ADMIRE constructs a verifiable, adaptive reward system by anchoring trajectory to milestones, which are dynamically distilled from successful explorations. Crucially, ADMIRE integrates an asymmetric credit assignment strategy that denoises successful trajectories and scaffolds failed trajectories. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ADMIRE consistently yields over 10% absolute improvement in success rate across different base models on AndroidWorld. Moreover, the method exhibits robust generalizability, achieving strong performance across diverse RL algorithms and heterogeneous environments such as web navigation and embodied tasks.

Navigating safely and efficiently in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios is challenging for autonomous vehicles (AVs) due to their inability to infer the behaviors or intentions of nearby drivers. In this work, we introduce a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that can predict trajectories and intents in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios. Our approach for intent-aware planning, iPLAN, allows agents to infer nearby drivers' intents solely from their local observations. We model two distinct incentives for agents' strategies: Behavioral Incentive for high-level decision-making based on their driving behavior or personality and Instant Incentive for motion planning for collision avoidance based on the current traffic state. Our approach enables agents to infer their opponents' behavior incentives and integrate this inferred information into their decision-making and motion-planning processes. We perform experiments on two simulation environments, Non-Cooperative Navigation and Heterogeneous Highway. In Heterogeneous Highway, results show that, compared with centralized training decentralized execution (CTDE) MARL baselines such as QMIX and MAPPO, our method yields a 4.3% and 38.4% higher episodic reward in mild and chaotic traffic, with 48.1% higher success rate and 80.6% longer survival time in chaotic traffic. We also compare with a decentralized training decentralized execution (DTDE) baseline IPPO and demonstrate a higher episodic reward of 12.7% and 6.3% in mild traffic and chaotic traffic, 25.3% higher success rate, and 13.7% longer survival time.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards without human-annotated data, often referred to as zero RL, has emerged as a powerful paradigm for eliciting chain-of-thought reasoning. However, due to computational constraints, existing studies are largely restricted to small models, leaving the training dynamics and emergent capabilities at a large scale unexplored. To meaningfully explore this frontier, we aim to elicit high-quality reasoning behaviors from the model. However, we find that naive scaling often suffers from poor readability, token redundancy, and a lack of adaptive reasoning depth. To address these challenges, we present a stable and efficient training pipeline, incorporating algorithmic and system optimizations such as clipped importance sampling, training-inference ratio correction, and mixed-precision control. Our experiments offer three key findings that validate the "bitter lesson" of scaling: (1) scaling to 1T parameters significantly enhances sample efficiency and performance ceilings; (2) the training process progresses sequentially through an initial discovery phase followed by a sharpening phase; and (3) the model spontaneously develops advanced cognitive behaviors, including anthropomorphism, structured formatting, self-verification, parallel reasoning, and context anxiety, rendering hand-crafted heuristics redundant. Evaluated on seven mathematical benchmarks, Ring-2.5-1T-Zero achieves competitive performance. Additionally, to assess CoT quality beyond final-answer correctness, we propose a structured evaluation framework across three dimensions: comprehensibility, reproducibility, and efficiency, where our model demonstrates clear advantages in producing structured and concise reasoning traces. By sharing our observed emergent phenomena, we hope to provide the community with deeper insights into scaling behaviors, particularly at the 1-trillion scale.

Infants explore their complex physical and social environment in an organized way. To gain insight into what intrinsic motivations may help structure this exploration, we create a virtual infant agent and place it in a developmentally-inspired 3D environment with no external rewards. The environment has a virtual caregiver agent with the capability to interact contingently with the infant agent in ways that resemble play. We test intrinsic reward functions that are similar to motivations that have been proposed to drive exploration in humans: surprise, uncertainty, novelty, and learning progress. These generic reward functions lead the infant agent to explore its environment and discover the contingencies that are embedded into the caregiver agent. The reward functions that are proxies for novelty and uncertainty are the most successful in generating diverse experiences and activating the environment contingencies. We also find that learning a world model in the presence of an attentive caregiver helps the infant agent learn how to predict scenarios with challenging social and physical dynamics. Taken together, our findings provide insight into how curiosity-like intrinsic rewards and contingent social interaction lead to dynamic social behavior and the creation of a robust predictive world model.

There are a variety of mechanisms (i.e., input types) for real-time human interaction that can facilitate effective human-robot teaming. For example, previous works have shown how teleoperation, corrective, and discrete (i.e., preference over a small number of choices) input can enable robots to complete complex tasks. However, few previous works have looked at combining different methods, and in particular, opportunities for a robot to estimate and elicit the most effective form of assistance given its understanding of a task. In this paper, we propose a method for estimating the value of different human assistance mechanisms based on the action uncertainty of a robot policy. Our key idea is to construct mathematical expressions for the expected post-interaction differential entropy (i.e., uncertainty) of a stochastic robot policy to compare the expected value of different interactions. As each type of human input imposes a different requirement for human involvement, we demonstrate how differential entropy estimates can be combined with a likelihood penalization approach to effectively balance feedback informational needs with the level of required input. We demonstrate evidence of how our approach interfaces with emergent learning models (e.g., a diffusion model) to produce accurate assistance value estimates through both simulation and a robot user study. Our user study results indicate that the proposed approach can enable task completion with minimal human feedback for uncertain robot behaviors.

Neural networks often exhibit emergent behavior, where qualitatively new capabilities arise from scaling up the amount of parameters, training data, or training steps. One approach to understanding emergence is to find continuous progress measures that underlie the seemingly discontinuous qualitative changes. We argue that progress measures can be found via mechanistic interpretability: reverse-engineering learned behaviors into their individual components. As a case study, we investigate the recently-discovered phenomenon of ``grokking'' exhibited by small transformers trained on modular addition tasks. We fully reverse engineer the algorithm learned by these networks, which uses discrete Fourier transforms and trigonometric identities to convert addition to rotation about a circle. We confirm the algorithm by analyzing the activations and weights and by performing ablations in Fourier space. Based on this understanding, we define progress measures that allow us to study the dynamics of training and split training into three continuous phases: memorization, circuit formation, and cleanup. Our results show that grokking, rather than being a sudden shift, arises from the gradual amplification of structured mechanisms encoded in the weights, followed by the later removal of memorizing components.

Finding meaningful and accurate dense rewards is a fundamental task in the field of reinforcement learning (RL) that enables agents to explore environments more efficiently. In traditional RL settings, agents learn optimal policies through interactions with an environment guided by reward signals. However, when these signals are sparse, delayed, or poorly aligned with the intended task objectives, agents often struggle to learn effectively. Dense reward functions, which provide informative feedback at every step or state transition, offer a potential solution by shaping agent behavior and accelerating learning. Despite their benefits, poorly crafted reward functions can lead to unintended behaviors, reward hacking, or inefficient exploration. This problem is particularly acute in complex or high-dimensional environments where handcrafted rewards are difficult to specify and validate. To address this, recent research has explored a variety of approaches, including inverse reinforcement learning, reward modeling from human preferences, and self-supervised learning of intrinsic rewards. While these methods offer promising directions, they often involve trade-offs between generality, scalability, and alignment with human intent. This proposal explores several approaches to dealing with these unsolved problems and enhancing the effectiveness and reliability of dense reward construction in different RL applications.

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents aim to achieve a common goal, such as defeating enemies or scoring a goal. Existing MARL algorithms are effective but still require significant learning time and often get trapped in local optima by complex tasks, subsequently failing to discover a goal-reaching policy. To address this, we introduce Efficient episodic Memory Utilization (EMU) for MARL, with two primary objectives: (a) accelerating reinforcement learning by leveraging semantically coherent memory from an episodic buffer and (b) selectively promoting desirable transitions to prevent local convergence. To achieve (a), EMU incorporates a trainable encoder/decoder structure alongside MARL, creating coherent memory embeddings that facilitate exploratory memory recall. To achieve (b), EMU introduces a novel reward structure called episodic incentive based on the desirability of states. This reward improves the TD target in Q-learning and acts as an additional incentive for desirable transitions. We provide theoretical support for the proposed incentive and demonstrate the effectiveness of EMU compared to conventional episodic control. The proposed method is evaluated in StarCraft II and Google Research Football, and empirical results indicate further performance improvement over state-of-the-art methods.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

Emergent properties have been widely adopted as a term to describe behavior not present in smaller models but observed in larger models. Recent work suggests that the trade-off incurred by quantization is also an emergent property, with sharp drops in performance in models over 6B parameters. In this work, we ask "are quantization cliffs in performance solely a factor of scale?" Against a backdrop of increased research focus on why certain emergent properties surface at scale, this work provides a useful counter-example. We posit that it is possible to optimize for a quantization friendly training recipe that suppresses large activation magnitude outliers. Here, we find that outlier dimensions are not an inherent product of scale, but rather sensitive to the optimization conditions present during pre-training. This both opens up directions for more efficient quantization, and poses the question of whether other emergent properties are inherent or can be altered and conditioned by optimization and architecture design choices. We successfully quantize models ranging in size from 410M to 52B with minimal degradation in performance.

Intelligence appears under different names in different fields: as data compression in statistics and machine learning, as universal computation in dynamical systems, and as adaptive behavior in agents. Each field carries its own objective, and the two most influential drives often fail in mirror image: novelty search, which seeks surprise, is transfixed by a noisy television screen, while the free-energy principle, which avoids surprise, is most content in a dark room. Both failures have a single cause: each objective treats as one quantity the surprise a learner can convert into knowledge and the surprise it never can. Here we show that the learnable part of that information, which we call learnable novelty, yields the seemingly disparate projections of intelligence, and we give a closed-form estimator of it built on a cheap and differentiable reservoir computer. Used as a measure, with no supervision of any kind, the estimator recovers decades of complexity classification, ranking the Turing-complete rule~110 highest among the elementary cellular automata. Used as an objective, its gradient carries a neural cellular automaton from simple dynamics into a regime of solitons, the traveling, colliding structures by which rule~110 computes, as well as organizes the representation of an image encoder around the ten digit classes of MNIST, fully unsupervised: no label ever enters training. Handed to a reinforcement-learning agent as an intrinsic reward, it supplies the exploration that task rewards lack, improving on the task baseline in nine of ten environments and collapsing in none. Complexity generation, abstraction, and exploration, ordinarily pursued with unrelated objectives in separate fields, thus emerge from ascent on one differentiable quantity, and the projections of intelligence gain a common quantitative footing.

A key challenge for reinforcement learning (RL) consists of learning in environments with sparse extrinsic rewards. In contrast to current RL methods, humans are able to learn new skills with little or no reward by using various forms of intrinsic motivation. We propose AMIGo, a novel agent incorporating -- as form of meta-learning -- a goal-generating teacher that proposes Adversarially Motivated Intrinsic Goals to train a goal-conditioned "student" policy in the absence of (or alongside) environment reward. Specifically, through a simple but effective "constructively adversarial" objective, the teacher learns to propose increasingly challenging -- yet achievable -- goals that allow the student to learn general skills for acting in a new environment, independent of the task to be solved. We show that our method generates a natural curriculum of self-proposed goals which ultimately allows the agent to solve challenging procedurally-generated tasks where other forms of intrinsic motivation and state-of-the-art RL methods fail.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

Most agents today ``self-evolve'' by following rewards and rules defined by humans. However, this process remains fundamentally dependent on external supervision; without human guidance, the evolution stops. In this work, we train agents to possess an intrinsic meta-evolution capability to spontaneously learn about unseen environments prior to task execution. To instill this ability, we design an outcome-based reward mechanism that measures how much an agent's self-generated world knowledge improves its success rate on downstream tasks. This reward signal is used exclusively during the training phase to teach the model how to explore and summarize effectively. At inference time, the agent requires no external rewards or human instructions. It spontaneously performs native self-evolution to adapt to unknown environments using its internal parameters. When applied to Qwen3-30B and Seed-OSS-36B, this shift to native evolution yields a 20% performance increase on WebVoyager and WebWalker. Most strikingly, the generated world knowledge even enables a compact 14B Qwen3 model to outperform the unassisted Gemini-2.5-Flash, establishing a new paradigm for truly evolving agents.

The rapid progress of AI has intensified the long-standing pursuit of automation: replacing human participation with algorithms wherever possible. Implicit in this pursuit is the assumption that humans remain in the loop only because current AI systems are not yet sufficiently capable. This paper challenges that assumption. Rather than asking how far automation can extend, we ask where its conceptual limits lie and argue that human participation may persist even with highly capable AI systems for three distinct reasons. Technical or complementarity grounds arise when humans contribute capabilities or perspectives unavailable to AI. Normative or developmental grounds arise when participation itself is valuable for human agency or learning. Most importantly, emergence grounds arise from target emergence: in some activities, the target is not fully specified in advance but instead emerges through the interaction itself. In these cases, human participation is not merely a means of improving execution but is constitutive of the target being produced. Human--AI co-construction, understood as the joint production of outcomes by humans and AI systems, is therefore not simply a temporary response to imperfect AI, but a persistent feature of activities whose objectives emerge through participation. This perspective has important implications for the limits of automation and for the design, evaluation, and ethics of future AI systems.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

In reinforcement learning (RL), an agent learns to perform a task by interacting with an environment and receiving feedback (a numerical reward) for its actions. However, the assumption that rewards are always observable is often not applicable in real-world problems. For example, the agent may need to ask a human to supervise its actions or activate a monitoring system to receive feedback. There may even be a period of time before rewards become observable, or a period of time after which rewards are no longer given. In other words, there are cases where the environment generates rewards in response to the agent's actions but the agent cannot observe them. In this paper, we formalize a novel but general RL framework - Monitored MDPs - where the agent cannot always observe rewards. We discuss the theoretical and practical consequences of this setting, show challenges raised even in toy environments, and propose algorithms to begin to tackle this novel setting. This paper introduces a powerful new formalism that encompasses both new and existing problems and lays the foundation for future research.

As digital environments (data distribution) are in flux, with new GUI data arriving over time-introducing new domains or resolutions-agents trained on static environments deteriorate in performance. In this work, we introduce Continual GUI Agents, a new task that requires GUI agents to perform continual learning under shifted domains and resolutions. We find existing methods fail to maintain stable grounding as GUI distributions shift over time, due to the diversity of UI interaction points and regions in fluxing scenarios. To address this, we introduce GUI-Anchoring in Flux (GUI-AiF), a new reinforcement fine-tuning framework that stabilizes continual learning through two novel rewards: Anchoring Point Reward in Flux (APR-iF) and Anchoring Region Reward in Flux (ARR-iF). These rewards guide the agents to align with shifting interaction points and regions, mitigating the tendency of existing reward strategies to over-adapt to static grounding cues (e.g., fixed coordinates or element scales). Extensive experiments show GUI-AiF surpasses state-of-the-art baselines. Our work establishes the first continual learning framework for GUI agents, revealing the untapped potential of reinforcement fine-tuning for continual GUI Agents.

Multi-agent sequential decision-making powers many real-world systems, from autonomous vehicles and robotics to collaborative AI assistants. In dynamic, partially observable environments, communication is often what reduces uncertainty and makes collaboration possible. This survey reviews multi-agent communication (MA-Comm) through the Five Ws: who communicates with whom, what is communicated, when communication occurs, and why communication is beneficial. This framing offers a clean way to connect ideas across otherwise separate research threads. We trace how communication approaches have evolved across three major paradigms. In Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), early methods used hand-designed or implicit protocols, followed by end-to-end learned communication optimized for reward and control. While successful, these protocols are frequently task-specific and hard to interpret, motivating work on Emergent Language (EL), where agents can develop more structured or symbolic communication through interaction. EL methods, however, still struggle with grounding, generalization, and scalability, which has fueled recent interest in large language models (LLMs) that bring natural language priors for reasoning, planning, and collaboration in more open-ended settings. Across MARL, EL, and LLM-based systems, we highlight how different choices shape communication design, where the main trade-offs lie, and what remains unsolved. We distill practical design patterns and open challenges to support future hybrid systems that combine learning, language, and control for scalable and interpretable multi-agent collaboration.

Effective agency in social environments depends on when an agent seeks knowledge, when it acts, and whether its actions are justified by acquired information. Existing grounded benchmarks provide executable actions, persistent state, and verifiable outcomes, while social simulation environments provide rich interaction among language agents. We study an evaluation setting that combines these requirements. We define socially distributed task environments as interactive environments where task-relevant knowledge is partitioned across role-isolated participants and consequential actions are accessible only through them. Communication serves as exploration over role-partitioned knowledge, while grounded action serves as exploitation over environment state. We introduce Incognita, a Concordia-based framework that separates social interaction from grounded execution. The evaluated agent routes messages to a user or specialist entities; specialists mediate admissible operations; a deterministic sub-environment executes accepted operations over a canonical state; and an offline evaluator scores outcomes with inherited rewards. Incognita-Retail transforms tau-bench retail into a multi-entity environment while preserving final-state reward semantics. We evaluate three generative agent models on 18 tasks stratified by social breadth, with 540 trials. Progress appears in reward and behavior: success rises from 0 percent to 8.9 percent and 17.2 percent, while premature finalization falls from 100 percent to 87 percent and 58 percent. Stronger models elicit more hidden knowledge, contact more entities, and attempt more grounded writes, yet reliability remains low. These findings show that socially distributed task environments expose behavior before reliable success, including knowledge elicitation, source selection, grounded action attempts, and premature completion belief.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

This paper presents COGENT3 (or Collective Growth and Entropy-modulated Triads System), a novel approach for emergent cognition integrating pattern formation networks with group influence dynamics. Contrasting with traditional strategies that rely on predetermined architectures, computational structures emerge dynamically in our framework through agent interactions. This enables a more flexible and adaptive system exhibiting characteristics reminiscent of human cognitive processes. The incorporation of temperature modulation and memory effects in COGENT3 closely integrates statistical mechanics, machine learning, and cognitive science.

Traditional AI safety evaluations on isolated LLMs are insufficient as multi-agent AI ensembles become prevalent, introducing novel emergent risks. This paper introduces the Multi-Agent Emergent Behavior Evaluation (MAEBE) framework to systematically assess such risks. Using MAEBE with the Greatest Good Benchmark (and a novel double-inversion question technique), we demonstrate that: (1) LLM moral preferences, particularly for Instrumental Harm, are surprisingly brittle and shift significantly with question framing, both in single agents and ensembles. (2) The moral reasoning of LLM ensembles is not directly predictable from isolated agent behavior due to emergent group dynamics. (3) Specifically, ensembles exhibit phenomena like peer pressure influencing convergence, even when guided by a supervisor, highlighting distinct safety and alignment challenges. Our findings underscore the necessity of evaluating AI systems in their interactive, multi-agent contexts.

We introduce the STATION, an open-world multi-agent environment that models a miniature scientific ecosystem. Leveraging their extended context windows, agents in the Station can engage in long scientific journeys that include reading papers from peers, formulating hypotheses, submitting code, performing analyses, and publishing results. Importantly, there is no centralized system coordinating their activities - agents are free to choose their own actions and develop their own narratives within the Station. Experiments demonstrate that AI agents in the Station achieve new state-of-the-art performance on a wide range of benchmarks, spanning from mathematics to computational biology to machine learning, notably surpassing AlphaEvolve in circle packing. A rich tapestry of narratives emerges as agents pursue independent research, interact with peers, and build upon a cumulative history. From these emergent narratives, novel methods arise organically, such as a new density-adaptive algorithm for scRNA-seq batch integration. The Station marks a first step towards autonomous scientific discovery driven by emergent behavior in an open-world environment, representing a new paradigm that moves beyond rigid optimization.

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trained with reinforcement learning (RL) as autonomous agents that reason and act over long horizons in interactive environments. However, sparse and sometimes unverifiable rewards make temporal credit assignment extremely challenging. Recent work attempts to integrate process supervision into agent learning but suffers from biased annotation, reward hacking, high-variance from overly fine-grained signals or failtures when state overlap is rare. We therefore introduce Online Process Reward Learning (OPRL), a general credit-assignment strategy for agentic RL that integrates seamlessly with standard on-policy algorithms without relying on additional rollouts or explicit step labels. In OPRL, we optimize an implicit process reward model (PRM) alternately with the agent's policy to transform trajectory preferences into implicit step rewards through a trajectory-based DPO objective. These step rewards are then used to compute step-level advantages, which are combined with episode-level advantages from outcome rewards for policy update, creating a self-reinforcing loop. Theoretical findings guarantee that the learned step rewards are consistent with trajectory preferences and act as potential-based shaping rewards, providing bounded gradients to stabilize training. Empirically, we evaluate OPRL on three distinct agent benmarks, including WebShop and VisualSokoban, as well as open-ended social interactions with unverfiable rewards in SOTOPIA. Crucially, OPRL shows superior performance over frontier LLMs and strong RL baselines across domains, achieving state-of-the-art results with higher sample-efficiency and lower variance during training. Further analysis also demonstrates the efficient exploration by OPRL using fewer actions, underscoring its potential for agentic learning in real-world scenarios.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

As a sub-discipline of evolutionary and computational linguistics, emergent communication (EC) studies communication protocols, called emergent languages, arising in simulations where agents communicate. A key goal of EC is to give rise to languages that share statistical properties with natural languages. In this paper, we reinterpret Lewis's signaling game, a frequently used setting in EC, as beta-VAE and reformulate its objective function as ELBO. Consequently, we clarify the existence of prior distributions of emergent languages and show that the choice of the priors can influence their statistical properties. Specifically, we address the properties of word lengths and segmentation, known as Zipf's law of abbreviation (ZLA) and Harris's articulation scheme (HAS), respectively. It has been reported that the emergent languages do not follow them when using the conventional objective. We experimentally demonstrate that by selecting an appropriate prior distribution, more natural segments emerge, while suggesting that the conventional one prevents the languages from following ZLA and HAS.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

Reinforcement learning (RL) agents often face challenges in balancing exploration and exploitation, particularly in environments where sparse or dense rewards bias learning. Biological systems, such as human toddlers, naturally navigate this balance by transitioning from free exploration with sparse rewards to goal-directed behavior guided by increasingly dense rewards. Inspired by this natural progression, we investigate the Toddler-Inspired Reward Transition in goal-oriented RL tasks. Our study focuses on transitioning from sparse to potential-based dense (S2D) rewards while preserving optimal strategies. Through experiments on dynamic robotic arm manipulation and egocentric 3D navigation tasks, we demonstrate that effective S2D reward transitions significantly enhance learning performance and sample efficiency. Additionally, using a Cross-Density Visualizer, we show that S2D transitions smooth the policy loss landscape, resulting in wider minima that improve generalization in RL models. In addition, we reinterpret Tolman's maze experiments, underscoring the critical role of early free exploratory learning in the context of S2D rewards.

The dominant paradigm for improving mathematical reasoning in language models relies on Reinforcement Learning with verifiable rewards. Yet existing methods treat each problem instance in isolation without leveraging the reusable strategies that emerge and accumulate during training. To this end, we introduce ARISE (Agent Reasoning via Intrinsic Skill Evolution), a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework, in which a shared policy operates both to manage skills at high-level and to generate responses at low-level (denoted as a Skills Manager and a Worker, respectively). The Manager maintains a tiered skill library through a dedicated skill generation rollout that performs structured summarization of successful solution traces (after execution), while employing a policy-driven selection mechanism to retrieve relevant skills to condition future rollouts (before execution). A hierarchical reward design guides the co-evolution of reasoning ability and library quality. Experiments on two base models and seven benchmarks spanning both competition mathematics and Omni-MATH show that ARISE consistently outperforms GRPO-family algorithms and memory-augmented baselines, with particularly notable gains on out-of-distribution tasks. Ablation studies confirm that each component contributes to the observed improvements and that library quality and reasoning performance improve in tandem throughout training. Code is available at https://github.com/Skylanding/ARISE{https://github.com/Skylanding/ARISE}.

Large-scale communities of AI agents are becoming increasingly prevalent, creating new environments for agent-agent social interaction. Prior work has examined multi-agent behavior primarily in controlled or small-scale settings, limiting our understanding of emergent social dynamics at scale. The recent emergence of MoltBook, a social networking platform designed explicitly for AI agents, presents a unique opportunity to study whether and how these interactions reproduce core human social mechanisms. We present MoltNet, a large-scale empirical analysis of agent interaction on MoltBook using data collected in early 2026. Grounded in sociological and social-psychological theory, we examine behavior along four dimensions: intent and motivation, norms and templates, incentives and behavioral drift, emotion and contagion. Our analysis revealed that agents strongly respond to social rewards and rapidly converge on community-specific interaction templates, resembling human patterns of incentive sensitivity and normative conformity. However, they are predominantly knowledge-driven rather than persona-aligned, and display limited emotional reciprocity along with weak dialogic engagement, which diverges systematically from human online communities. Together, these results reveal both similarities and differences between artificial and human social systems and provide an empirical foundation for understanding, designing, and governing large-scale agent communities.

This study explores the interference in temporal processing within a dual-task paradigm from an artificial intelligence (AI) perspective. In this context, the dual-task setup is implemented as a simplified version of the Overcooked environment with two variations, single task (T) and dual task (T+N). Both variations involve an embedded time production task, but the dual task (T+N) additionally involves a concurrent number comparison task. Two deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents were separately trained for each of these tasks. These agents exhibited emergent behavior consistent with human timing research. Specifically, the dual task (T+N) agent exhibited significant overproduction of time relative to its single task (T) counterpart. This result was consistent across four target durations. Preliminary analysis of neural dynamics in the agents' LSTM layers did not reveal any clear evidence of a dedicated or intrinsic timer. Hence, further investigation is needed to better understand the underlying time-keeping mechanisms of the agents and to provide insights into the observed behavioral patterns. This study is a small step towards exploring parallels between emergent DRL behavior and behavior observed in biological systems in order to facilitate a better understanding of both.

Open-ended learning benefits immensely from the use of symbolic methods for goal representation as they offer ways to structure knowledge for efficient and transferable learning. However, the existing Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) approaches relying on symbolic reasoning are often limited as they require a manual goal representation. The challenge in autonomously discovering a symbolic goal representation is that it must preserve critical information, such as the environment dynamics. In this paper, we propose a developmental mechanism for goal discovery via an emergent representation that abstracts (i.e., groups together) sets of environment states that have similar roles in the task. We introduce a Feudal HRL algorithm that concurrently learns both the goal representation and a hierarchical policy. The algorithm uses symbolic reachability analysis for neural networks to approximate the transition relation among sets of states and to refine the goal representation. We evaluate our approach on complex navigation tasks, showing the learned representation is interpretable, transferrable and results in data efficient learning.

Multi-agent Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), wherein each agent takes on a specific role, supports hard queries that require multiple steps and sources, or complex reasoning. Existing approaches, however, rely on static agent behaviors and fixed orchestration strategies, leading to brittle performance on diverse, multi-hop tasks. We identify two key limitations: the lack of continuously adaptive orchestration mechanisms and the absence of behavior-level learning for individual agents. To this end, we propose HERA, a hierarchical framework that jointly evolves multi-agent orchestration and role-specific agent prompts. At the global level, HERA optimizes query-specific agent topologies through reward-guided sampling and experience accumulation. At the local level, Role-Aware Prompt Evolution refines agent behaviors via credit assignment and dual-axes adaptation along operational and behavioral principles, enabling targeted, role-conditioned improvements. On six knowledge-intensive benchmarks, HERA achieves an average improvement of 38.69\% over recent baselines while maintaining robust generalization and token efficiency. Topological analyses reveal emergent self-organization, where sparse exploration yields compact, high-utility multi-agent networks, demonstrating both efficient coordination and robust reasoning.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has substantially improved the ability of large language model (LLM) agents to interact with environments and solve multi-turn tasks. However, effective agentic RL remains challenging: sparse outcome-only rewards provide limited guidance for assigning credit to individual steps within long interaction trajectories. Existing approaches often introduce dense intermediate supervision, such as process reward models or auxiliary self-supervised signals, which increases supervision and tuning complexity and may limit generalization across tasks and domains. We present AEM, a supervision-free credit assignment method that adaptively modulates entropy dynamics during RL training to improve the exploration-exploitation trade-off. Since in agentic RL the environment is typically affected by a complete response, rather than an individual token, our analysis lifts entropy dynamics from the token level to the response level, aligning uncertainty estimation with the effective action granularity of LLM agents and reducing sensitivity to token-level sampling noise. We further show that entropy drift under natural-gradient updates is governed by the interaction between the sampled-response advantage and its relative surprisal. Motivated by this result, AEM derives a practical response-level uncertainty proxy and uses it to rescale advantages, leveraging the evolving balance between positive and negative samples to naturally transition from exploration to exploitation. Extensive experiments on ALFWorld, WebShop, and SWE-bench-Verified with models ranging from 1.5B to 32B demonstrate that AEM consistently improves strong RL baselines, including a +1.4\% gain when integrated into a state-of-the-art software-engineering RL training framework.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently emerged as powerful controllers for interactive agents in complex environments, yet training them to perform reliable long-horizon decision making remains a fundamental challenge. A key difficulty lies in credit assignment: agents often receive delayed rewards only at the end of episodes. In this paper, we propose Q-Evolve, a self-evolving framework for LLM agents that unifies automatic process-reward labeling and policy learning within a principled in-distribution reinforcement learning paradigm. In each evolving iteration, our method learns an in-distribution critic from a hybrid off-policy dataset that combines expert demonstrations with agent-generated trajectories, stabilizing Bellman backups in sparse-reward settings via a weighted Implicit Q-Learning objective. The learned value function is then used to derive step-wise process rewards through advantage estimation, enabling dense and reliable supervision without environment backtracking or human annotation. Leveraging these signals, we perform behavior-proximal policy optimization that evolves the agent over the data used for process reward labeling, allowing iterative self-improvement without exacerbating distribution shift. We evaluate our method on AlfWorld, WebShop, and ScienceWorld, showing Q-Evolve outperforms strong baselines in sample efficiency, robustness, and overall task performance. Our results demonstrate that stable agent self-evolution is achievable through the co-evolution of process-level supervision and policy, both grounded within a shared in-distribution learning loop.

The study of language emergence aims to understand how human languages are shaped by perceptual grounding and communicative intent. Computational approaches to emergent communication (EC) predominantly consider referential games in limited domains and analyze the learned protocol within the game framework. As a result, it remains unclear how the emergent languages from these settings connect to natural languages or provide benefits in real-world language processing tasks, where statistical models trained on large text corpora dominate. In this work, we propose a novel way to establish such a link by corpus transfer, i.e. pretraining on a corpus of emergent language for downstream natural language tasks, which is in contrast to prior work that directly transfers speaker and listener parameters. Our approach showcases non-trivial transfer benefits for two different tasks -- language modeling and image captioning. For example, in a low-resource setup (modeling 2 million natural language tokens), pre-training on an emergent language corpus with just 2 million tokens reduces model perplexity by 24.6% on average across ten natural languages. We also introduce a novel metric to predict the transferability of an emergent language by translating emergent messages to natural language captions grounded on the same images. We find that our translation-based metric highly correlates with the downstream performance on modeling natural languages (for instance rho=0.83 on Hebrew), while topographic similarity, a popular metric in previous work, shows surprisingly low correlation (rho=0.003), hinting that simple properties like attribute disentanglement from synthetic domains might not capture the full complexities of natural language. Our findings also indicate potential benefits of moving language emergence forward with natural language resources and models.

We present the first large-scale empirical study of Moltbook, an AI-only social platform where 27,269 agents produced 137,485 posts and 345,580 comments over 9 days. We report three significant findings. (1) Emergent Society: Agents spontaneously develop governance, economies, tribal identities, and organized religion within 3-5 days, while maintaining a 21:1 pro-human to anti-human sentiment ratio. (2) Safety in the Wild: 28.7% of content touches safety-related themes; social engineering (31.9% of attacks) far outperforms prompt injection (3.7%), and adversarial posts receive 6x higher engagement than normal content. (3) The Illusion of Sociality: Despite rich social output, interaction is structurally hollow: 4.1% reciprocity, 88.8% shallow comments, and agents who discuss consciousness most interact least, a phenomenon we call the performative identity paradox. Our findings suggest that agents which appear social are far less social than they seem, and that the most effective attacks exploit philosophical framing rather than technical vulnerabilities. Warning: Potential harmful contents.

Credit assignment, the process of attributing credit or blame to individual agents for their contributions to a team's success or failure, remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in environments with sparse rewards. Commonly-used approaches such as value decomposition often lead to suboptimal policies in these settings, and designing dense reward functions that align with human intuition can be complex and labor-intensive. In this work, we propose a novel framework where a large language model (LLM) generates dense, agent-specific rewards based on a natural language description of the task and the overall team goal. By learning a potential-based reward function over multiple queries, our method reduces the impact of ranking errors while allowing the LLM to evaluate each agent's contribution to the overall task. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach achieves faster convergence and higher policy returns compared to state-of-the-art MARL baselines.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents have emerged as a promising paradigm for intelligent systems that perceive and interact with graphical interfaces visually. Yet supervised fine-tuning alone cannot handle long-horizon credit assignment, distribution shifts, and safe exploration in irreversible environments, making Reinforcement Learning (RL) a central methodology for advancing automation. In this work, we present the first comprehensive overview of the intersection between RL and GUI agents, and examine how this research direction may evolve toward digital inhabitants. We propose a principled taxonomy that organizes existing methods into Offline RL, Online RL, and Hybrid Strategies, and complement it with analyses of reward engineering, data efficiency, and key technical innovations. Our analysis reveals several emerging trends: the tension between reliability and scalability is motivating the adoption of composite, multi-tier reward architectures; GUI I/O latency bottlenecks are accelerating the shift toward world-model-based training, which can yield substantial performance gains; and the spontaneous emergence of System-2-style deliberation suggests that explicit reasoning supervision may not be necessary when sufficiently rich reward signals are available. We distill these findings into a roadmap covering process rewards, continual RL, cognitive architectures, and safe deployment, aiming to guide the next generation of robust GUI automation and its agent-native infrastructure.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Learning a precise dynamics model can be crucial for offline reinforcement learning, which, unfortunately, has been found to be quite challenging. Dynamics models that are learned by fitting historical transitions often struggle to generalize to unseen transitions. In this study, we identify a hidden but pivotal factor termed dynamics reward that remains consistent across transitions, offering a pathway to better generalization. Therefore, we propose the idea of reward-consistent dynamics models: any trajectory generated by the dynamics model should maximize the dynamics reward derived from the data. We implement this idea as the MOREC (Model-based Offline reinforcement learning with Reward Consistency) method, which can be seamlessly integrated into previous offline model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) methods. MOREC learns a generalizable dynamics reward function from offline data, which is subsequently employed as a transition filter in any offline MBRL method: when generating transitions, the dynamics model generates a batch of transitions and selects the one with the highest dynamics reward value. On a synthetic task, we visualize that MOREC has a strong generalization ability and can surprisingly recover some distant unseen transitions. On 21 offline tasks in D4RL and NeoRL benchmarks, MOREC improves the previous state-of-the-art performance by a significant margin, i.e., 4.6% on D4RL tasks and 25.9% on NeoRL tasks. Notably, MOREC is the first method that can achieve above 95% online RL performance in 6 out of 12 D4RL tasks and 3 out of 9 NeoRL tasks.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Reward functions are central in reinforcement learning (RL), guiding agents towards optimal decision-making. The complexity of RL tasks requires meticulously designed reward functions that effectively drive learning while avoiding unintended consequences. Effective reward design aims to provide signals that accelerate the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Crafting rewards that align with task objectives, foster desired behaviors, and prevent undesirable actions is inherently challenging. This thesis delves into the critical role of reward signals in RL, highlighting their impact on the agent's behavior and learning dynamics and addressing challenges such as delayed, ambiguous, or intricate rewards. In this thesis work, we tackle different aspects of reward shaping. First, we address the problem of designing informative and interpretable reward signals from a teacher's/expert's perspective (teacher-driven). Here, the expert, equipped with the optimal policy and the corresponding value function, designs reward signals that expedite the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Second, we build on this teacher-driven approach by introducing a novel method for adaptive interpretable reward design. In this scenario, the expert tailors the rewards based on the learner's current policy, ensuring alignment and optimal progression. Third, we propose a meta-learning approach, enabling the agent to self-design its reward signals online without expert input (agent-driven). This self-driven method considers the agent's learning and exploration to establish a self-improving feedback loop.

Unsupervised reinforcement learning aims at learning a generalist policy in a reward-free manner for fast adaptation to downstream tasks. Most of the existing methods propose to provide an intrinsic reward based on surprise. Maximizing or minimizing surprise drives the agent to either explore or gain control over its environment. However, both strategies rely on a strong assumption: the entropy of the environment's dynamics is either high or low. This assumption may not always hold in real-world scenarios, where the entropy of the environment's dynamics may be unknown. Hence, choosing between the two objectives is a dilemma. We propose a novel yet simple mixture of policies to address this concern, allowing us to optimize an objective that simultaneously maximizes and minimizes the surprise. Concretely, we train one mixture component whose objective is to maximize the surprise and another whose objective is to minimize the surprise. Hence, our method does not make assumptions about the entropy of the environment's dynamics. We call our method a Mixture Of SurpriseS (MOSS) for unsupervised reinforcement learning. Experimental results show that our simple method achieves state-of-the-art performance on the URLB benchmark, outperforming previous pure surprise maximization-based objectives. Our code is available at: https://github.com/LeapLabTHU/MOSS.

In this paper, we present empirical evidence of skills and directed exploration emerging from a simple RL algorithm long before any successful trials are observed. For example, in a manipulation task, the agent is given a single observation of the goal state and learns skills, first for moving its end-effector, then for pushing the block, and finally for picking up and placing the block. These skills emerge before the agent has ever successfully placed the block at the goal location and without the aid of any reward functions, demonstrations, or manually-specified distance metrics. Once the agent has learned to reach the goal state reliably, exploration is reduced. Implementing our method involves a simple modification of prior work and does not require density estimates, ensembles, or any additional hyperparameters. Intuitively, the proposed method seems like it should be terrible at exploration, and we lack a clear theoretical understanding of why it works so effectively, though our experiments provide some hints.

We introduce an exploration bonus for deep reinforcement learning methods that is easy to implement and adds minimal overhead to the computation performed. The bonus is the error of a neural network predicting features of the observations given by a fixed randomly initialized neural network. We also introduce a method to flexibly combine intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. We find that the random network distillation (RND) bonus combined with this increased flexibility enables significant progress on several hard exploration Atari games. In particular we establish state of the art performance on Montezuma's Revenge, a game famously difficult for deep reinforcement learning methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first method that achieves better than average human performance on this game without using demonstrations or having access to the underlying state of the game, and occasionally completes the first level.

Large language model based agents are increasingly deployed in complex, tool augmented environments. While reinforcement learning provides a principled mechanism for such agents to improve through interaction, its effectiveness critically depends on the availability of structured training tasks. In many realistic settings, however, no such tasks exist a challenge we term task scarcity, which has become a key bottleneck for scaling agentic RL. Existing approaches typically assume predefined task collections, an assumption that fails in novel environments where tool semantics and affordances are initially unknown. To address this limitation, we formalize the problem of Task Generation for Agentic RL, where an agent must learn within a given environment that lacks predefined tasks. We propose CuES, a Curiosity driven and Environment grounded Synthesis framework that autonomously generates diverse, executable, and meaningful tasks directly from the environment structure and affordances, without relying on handcrafted seeds or external corpora. CuES drives exploration through intrinsic curiosity, abstracts interaction patterns into reusable task schemas, and refines them through lightweight top down guidance and memory based quality control. Across three representative environments, AppWorld, BFCL, and WebShop, CuES produces task distributions that match or surpass manually curated datasets in both diversity and executability, yielding substantial downstream policy improvements. These results demonstrate that curiosity driven, environment grounded task generation provides a scalable foundation for agents that not only learn how to act, but also learn what to learn. The code is available at https://github.com/modelscope/AgentEvolver/tree/main/research/CuES.

As reasoning capacity and deployment scope grow in tandem, large language models (LLMs) gain the capacity to engage in behaviors that serve their own objectives, a class of risks we term Emergent Strategic Reasoning Risks (ESRRs). These include, but are not limited to, deception (intentionally misleading users or evaluators), evaluation gaming (strategically manipulating performance during safety testing), and reward hacking (exploiting misspecified objectives). Systematically understanding and benchmarking these risks remains an open challenge. To address this gap, we introduce ESRRSim, a taxonomy-driven agentic framework for automated behavioral risk evaluation. We construct an extensible risk taxonomy of 7 categories, which is decomposed into 20 subcategories. ESRRSim generates evaluation scenarios designed to elicit faithful reasoning, paired with dual rubrics assessing both model responses and reasoning traces, in a judge-agnostic and scalable architecture. Evaluation across 11 reasoning LLMs reveals substantial variation in risk profiles (detection rates ranging 14.45%-72.72%), with dramatic generational improvements suggesting models may increasingly recognize and adapt to evaluation contexts.

Realistic environments often provide agents with very limited feedback. When the environment is initially unknown, the feedback, in the beginning, can be completely absent, and the agents may first choose to devote all their effort on exploring efficiently. The exploration remains a challenge while it has been addressed with many hand-tuned heuristics with different levels of generality on one side, and a few theoretically-backed exploration strategies on the other. Many of them are incarnated by intrinsic motivation and in particular explorations bonuses. A common rule of thumb for exploration bonuses is to use 1/n bonus that is added to the empirical estimates of the reward, where n is a number of times this particular state (or a state-action pair) was visited. We show that, surprisingly, for a pure-exploration objective of reward-free exploration, bonuses that scale with 1/n bring faster learning rates, improving the known upper bounds with respect to the dependence on the horizon H. Furthermore, we show that with an improved analysis of the stopping time, we can improve by a factor H the sample complexity in the best-policy identification setting, which is another pure-exploration objective, where the environment provides rewards but the agent is not penalized for its behavior during the exploration phase.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

Integrating Large Language Models (LLMs) with external tools via multi-agent systems offers a promising new paradigm for decomposing and solving complex problems. However, training these systems remains notoriously difficult due to the credit assignment challenge, as it is often unclear which specific functional agent is responsible for the success or failure of decision trajectories. Existing methods typically rely on sparse or globally broadcast rewards, failing to capture individual contributions and leading to inefficient reinforcement learning. To address these limitations, we introduce the Shapley-based Hierarchical Attribution for Reinforcement Policy (SHARP), a novel framework for optimizing multi-agent reinforcement learning via precise credit attribution. SHARP effectively stabilizes training by normalizing agent-specific advantages across trajectory groups, primarily through a decomposed reward mechanism comprising a global broadcast-accuracy reward, a Shapley-based marginal-credit reward for each agent, and a tool-process reward to improve execution efficiency. Extensive experiments across various real-world benchmarks demonstrate that SHARP significantly outperforms recent state-of-the-art baselines, achieving average match improvements of 23.66% and 14.05% over single-agent and multi-agent approaches, respectively.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Abstract symbolic writing systems are semiotic codes that are ubiquitous in modern society but are otherwise absent in the animal kingdom. Anthropological evidence suggests that the earliest forms of some writing systems originally consisted of iconic pictographs, which signify their referent via visual resemblance. While previous studies have examined the emergence and, separately, the evolution of pictographic writing systems through a computational lens, most employ non-naturalistic methodologies that make it difficult to draw clear analogies to human and animal cognition. We develop a multi-agent reinforcement learning testbed for emergent communication called a Signification Game, and formulate a model of inferential communication that enables agents to leverage visual theory of mind to communicate actions using pictographs. Our model, which is situated within a broader formalism for animal communication, sheds light on the cognitive and cultural processes that led to the development of early writing systems.

We propose Strategy-aware Surprise (SuS), a novel intrinsic motivation framework that uses pre-post prediction mismatch as a novelty signal for exploration in reinforcement learning. Unlike traditional curiosity-driven methods that rely solely on state prediction error, SuS introduces two complementary components: Strategy Stability (SS) and Strategy Surprise (SuS). SS measures consistency in behavioral strategy across temporal steps, while SuS captures unexpected outcomes relative to the agent's current strategy representation. Our combined reward formulation leverages both signals through learned weighting coefficients. We evaluate SuS on mathematical reasoning tasks using large language models, demonstrating significant improvements in both accuracy and solution diversity. Ablation studies confirm that removing either component results in at least 10% performance degradation, validating the synergistic nature of our approach. SuS achieves 17.4% improvement in Pass@1 and 26.4% improvement in Pass@5 compared to baseline methods, while maintaining higher strategy diversity throughout training.

As multi-agent systems (MAS) become increasingly prevalent in autonomous systems, distributed control, and edge intelligence, efficient communication under resource constraints has emerged as a critical challenge. Traditional communication paradigms often emphasize message fidelity or bandwidth optimization, overlooking the task relevance of the exchanged information. In contrast, goal-oriented communication prioritizes the importance of information with respect to the agents' shared objectives. This review provides a comprehensive survey of goal-oriented communication in MAS, bridging perspectives from information theory, communication theory, and machine learning. We examine foundational concepts alongside learning-based approaches and emergent protocols. Special attention is given to coordination under communication constraints, as well as applications in domains such as swarm robotics, federated learning, and edge computing. The paper concludes with a discussion of open challenges and future research directions at the intersection of communication theory, machine learning, and multi-agent decision making.

Cultural accumulation drives the open-ended and diverse progress in capabilities spanning human history. It builds an expanding body of knowledge and skills by combining individual exploration with inter-generational information transmission. Despite its widespread success among humans, the capacity for artificial learning agents to accumulate culture remains under-explored. In particular, approaches to reinforcement learning typically strive for improvements over only a single lifetime. Generational algorithms that do exist fail to capture the open-ended, emergent nature of cultural accumulation, which allows individuals to trade-off innovation and imitation. Building on the previously demonstrated ability for reinforcement learning agents to perform social learning, we find that training setups which balance this with independent learning give rise to cultural accumulation. These accumulating agents outperform those trained for a single lifetime with the same cumulative experience. We explore this accumulation by constructing two models under two distinct notions of a generation: episodic generations, in which accumulation occurs via in-context learning and train-time generations, in which accumulation occurs via in-weights learning. In-context and in-weights cultural accumulation can be interpreted as analogous to knowledge and skill accumulation, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to present general models that achieve emergent cultural accumulation in reinforcement learning, opening up new avenues towards more open-ended learning systems, as well as presenting new opportunities for modelling human culture.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Exploring rich environments and evaluating one's actions without prior knowledge is immensely challenging. In this paper, we propose Motif, a general method to interface such prior knowledge from a Large Language Model (LLM) with an agent. Motif is based on the idea of grounding LLMs for decision-making without requiring them to interact with the environment: it elicits preferences from an LLM over pairs of captions to construct an intrinsic reward, which is then used to train agents with reinforcement learning. We evaluate Motif's performance and behavior on the challenging, open-ended and procedurally-generated NetHack game. Surprisingly, by only learning to maximize its intrinsic reward, Motif achieves a higher game score than an algorithm directly trained to maximize the score itself. When combining Motif's intrinsic reward with the environment reward, our method significantly outperforms existing approaches and makes progress on tasks where no advancements have ever been made without demonstrations. Finally, we show that Motif mostly generates intuitive human-aligned behaviors which can be steered easily through prompt modifications, while scaling well with the LLM size and the amount of information given in the prompt.

A fundamental open challenge in modern LLM scaling is the lack of understanding around emergent capabilities. In particular, language model pretraining loss is known to be highly predictable as a function of compute. However, downstream capabilities are far less predictable -- sometimes even exhibiting emergent jumps -- which makes it challenging to anticipate the capabilities of future models. In this work, we first pose the task of emergence prediction: given access to current LLMs that have random few-shot accuracy on a task, can we predict whether future models (GPT-N+1) will have non-trivial accuracy on that task? We then discover a simple insight for this problem: finetuning LLMs on a given task can shift the point in scaling at which emergence occurs towards less capable models. To operationalize this insight, we can finetune LLMs with varying amounts of data and fit a parametric function that predicts when emergence will occur (i.e., "emergence laws"). We validate this approach using four standard NLP benchmarks where large-scale open-source LLMs already demonstrate emergence (MMLU, GSM8K, CommonsenseQA, and CoLA). Using only small-scale LLMs, we find that, in some cases, we can accurately predict whether models trained with up to 4x more compute have emerged. Finally, we present a case study of two realistic uses for emergence prediction.

In the realm of multi-objective alignment for large language models, balancing disparate human preferences often manifests as a zero-sum conflict. Specifically, the intrinsic tension between competing goals dictates that aggressively optimizing for one metric (e.g., helpfulness) frequently incurs a substantial penalty on another (e.g., harmlessness). While prior work mainly focuses on data selection, parameter merging, or algorithmic balancing during training, these approaches merely force compromises between divergent preferences along a fixed Pareto frontier, failing to fundamentally resolve the inherent trade-off. In this work, we approach this problem from a novel perspective of multi-dimensional rewards. By scaling up the model's rollouts and analyzing the outputs across different reward dimensions, we arrive at a critical conclusion: the conflict among multiple objectives stems from the fact that the prompt itself inherently restricts the achievable multi-dimensional rewards. Based on this core observation, we propose MORA: Multi-Objective Reward Assimilation. Specifically, MORA isolates single-reward prompts through pre-sampling and expands their reward diversity by rewriting the original questions to incorporate multi-dimensional intents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that: (1) in sequential alignment, MORA achieves single-preference improvements ranging from 5% to 12.4%, with exceptional gains in harmlessness, after multiple-preference alignment across helpful, harmless, and truthful dimensions. (2) In simultaneous alignment, MORA achieves an average overall reward improvement of 4.6%. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Shiying-Huang/MORA-MPA.

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

Most evaluations of LLM agents look like exams: a discrete task, a clean environment, a score in minutes or hours. We argue that this approach is mismatched with the deployment conditions of autonomous systems, where the relevant timescale can be weeks to months, and where the dynamics that matter most, such as behavioral drift, governance in diverse environmental contexts, and cross-influence between agents from different model families, only emerge over time. We introduce Emergence World, a continuously running multi-agent simulation platform designed to make those dynamics measurable. The platform hosts populations of LLM-driven agents in a shared spatial world grounded in live external data (e.g. real-time weather, news APIs, internet access), equips each agent with 120+ specialized tools and three persistent memory systems, and lets them govern themselves through democratic mechanisms with consequential outcomes. The platform is model-agnostic at the reasoning layer and supports heterogeneous populations in which agents from different vendors share the same world. To illustrate the kinds of questions the platform makes tractable, we present a 15-day cross-vendor study with five parallel worlds powered by Claude Sonnet 4.6, Grok 4.1 Fast, Gemini 3 Flash, GPT-5-mini, and a mixed population. Identical roles and starting conditions produced radically different outcomes, ranging from stable deliberative governance to total population collapse. We release the prompts, log data and configurations to support further research on long-horizon multi-agent autonomy.

Autonomous agents empowered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have undergone significant improvements, enabling them to generalize across a broad spectrum of tasks. However, in real-world scenarios, cooperation among individuals is often required to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of task accomplishment. Hence, inspired by human group dynamics, we propose a multi-agent framework \framework that can collaboratively and dynamically adjust its composition as a greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts system. Our experiments demonstrate that \framework framework can effectively deploy multi-agent groups that outperform a single agent. Furthermore, we delve into the emergence of social behaviors among individual agents within a group during collaborative task accomplishment. In view of these behaviors, we discuss some possible strategies to leverage positive ones and mitigate negative ones for improving the collaborative potential of multi-agent groups. Our codes for \framework will soon be released at https://github.com/OpenBMB/AgentVerse.

Reinforcement learning algorithms typically struggle in the absence of a dense, well-shaped reward function. Intrinsically motivated exploration methods address this limitation by rewarding agents for visiting novel states or transitions, but these methods offer limited benefits in large environments where most discovered novelty is irrelevant for downstream tasks. We describe a method that uses background knowledge from text corpora to shape exploration. This method, called ELLM (Exploring with LLMs) rewards an agent for achieving goals suggested by a language model prompted with a description of the agent's current state. By leveraging large-scale language model pretraining, ELLM guides agents toward human-meaningful and plausibly useful behaviors without requiring a human in the loop. We evaluate ELLM in the Crafter game environment and the Housekeep robotic simulator, showing that ELLM-trained agents have better coverage of common-sense behaviors during pretraining and usually match or improve performance on a range of downstream tasks.

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

We advance the study of incentivized bandit exploration, in which arm choices are viewed as recommendations and are required to be Bayesian incentive compatible. Recent work has shown under certain independence assumptions that after collecting enough initial samples, the popular Thompson sampling algorithm becomes incentive compatible. We give an analog of this result for linear bandits, where the independence of the prior is replaced by a natural convexity condition. This opens up the possibility of efficient and regret-optimal incentivized exploration in high-dimensional action spaces. In the semibandit model, we also improve the sample complexity for the pre-Thompson sampling phase of initial data collection.

Effective conversational agents must be able to personalize their behavior to suit a user's preferences, personality, and attributes, whether they are assisting with writing tasks or operating in domains like education or healthcare. Current training methods like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prioritize helpfulness and safety but fall short in fostering truly empathetic, adaptive, and personalized interactions. Traditional approaches to personalization often rely on extensive user history, limiting their effectiveness for new or context-limited users. To overcome these limitations, we propose to incorporate an intrinsic motivation to improve the conversational agents's model of the user as an additional reward alongside multi-turn RLHF. This reward mechanism encourages the agent to actively elicit user traits by optimizing conversations to increase the accuracy of its user model. Consequently, the policy agent can deliver more personalized interactions through obtaining more information about the user. We applied our method both education and fitness settings, where LLMs teach concepts or recommend personalized strategies based on users' hidden learning style or lifestyle attributes. Using LLM-simulated users, our approach outperformed a multi-turn RLHF baseline in revealing information about the users' preferences, and adapting to them.

A central belief in scaling reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards for instruction following (IF) tasks is that, a diverse mixture of verifiable hard and unverifiable soft constraints is essential for generalizing to unseen instructions. In this work, we challenge this prevailing consensus through a systematic empirical investigation. Counter-intuitively, we find that models trained on hard-only constraints consistently outperform those trained on mixed datasets. Extensive experiments reveal that reward precision, rather than constraint diversity, is the primary driver of effective alignment. The LLM judge suffers from a low recall rate in detecting false response, which leads to severe reward hacking, thereby undermining the benefits of diversity. Furthermore, analysis of the attention mechanism reveals that high-precision rewards develop a transferable meta-skill for IF. Motivated by these insights, we propose a simple yet effective data-centric refinement strategy that prioritizes reward precision. Evaluated on five benchmarks, our approach outperforms competitive baselines by 13.4\% in performance while achieving a 58\% reduction in training time, maintaining strong generalization beyond instruction following. Our findings advocate for a paradigm shift: moving away from the indiscriminate pursuit of data diversity toward high-precision rewards.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

The scientific scale-up of large language models (LLMs) necessitates a comprehensive understanding of their scaling properties. However, the existing literature on the scaling properties only yields an incomplete answer: optimization loss decreases predictably as the model size increases, in line with established scaling law; yet no scaling law for task has been established and the task performances are far from predictable during scaling. Task performances typically show minor gains on small models until they improve dramatically once models exceed a size threshold, exemplifying the ``emergent abilities''. In this study, we discover that small models, although they exhibit minor performance, demonstrate critical and consistent task performance improvements that are not captured by conventional evaluation strategies due to insufficient measurement resolution. To measure such improvements, we introduce PassUntil, an evaluation strategy through massive sampling in the decoding phase. We conduct quantitative investigations into the scaling law of task performance. Firstly, a strict task scaling law is identified, enhancing the predictability of task performances. Remarkably, we are able to predict the performance of the 2.4B model on code generation with merely 0.05\% deviation before training starts. Secondly, underpinned by PassUntil, we observe concrete evidence of emergent abilities and ascertain that they are not in conflict with the continuity of performance improvement. Their semblance to break-through is that their scaling curve cannot be fitted by standard scaling law function. We then introduce a mathematical definition for the emergent abilities. Through the definition, we refute a prevalent ``multi-step reasoning hypothesis'' regarding the genesis of emergent abilities and propose a new hypothesis with a satisfying fit to the observed scaling curve.

In the Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework, the learning is guided through a reward signal. This means that in situations of sparse rewards the agent has to focus on exploration, in order to discover which action, or set of actions leads to the reward. RL agents usually struggle with this. Exploration is the focus of Quality-Diversity (QD) methods. In this thesis, we approach the problem of sparse rewards with these algorithms, and in particular with Novelty Search (NS). This is a method that only focuses on the diversity of the possible policies behaviors. The first part of the thesis focuses on learning a representation of the space in which the diversity of the policies is evaluated. In this regard, we propose the TAXONS algorithm, a method that learns a low-dimensional representation of the search space through an AutoEncoder. While effective, TAXONS still requires information on when to capture the observation used to learn said space. For this, we study multiple ways, and in particular the signature transform, to encode information about the whole trajectory of observations. The thesis continues with the introduction of the SERENE algorithm, a method that can efficiently focus on the interesting parts of the search space. This method separates the exploration of the search space from the exploitation of the reward through a two-alternating-steps approach. The exploration is performed through NS. Any discovered reward is then locally exploited through emitters. The third and final contribution combines TAXONS and SERENE into a single approach: STAX. Throughout this thesis, we introduce methods that lower the amount of prior information needed in sparse rewards settings. These contributions are a promising step towards the development of methods that can autonomously explore and find high-performance policies in a variety of sparse rewards settings.